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Abstract
On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann
characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, eciency, unanimity, scale covariance,
conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the rst ve axioms
is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open
problem. We show that for n = 2 the rst ve axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value,
provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of
a solution that satises the rst 5 axioms and violates IIA for 2-person NTU games (N;V ) with
uniformly p-smooth V (N).
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1 Introduction
Several versions of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) have been employed and
discussed in the literature in various elds of social sciences. In the context of NTU games, IIA (see
Axiom 2 in Section 2 for a formal denition) requires that, quoting Aumann (1985), \a value y of a
game W remains a value when one removes outcomes other than y (`irrelevant alternatives') from the set
W(N) of all feasible outcomes, without changing W(S) for coalitions other than the all player coalition."
IIA is a natural generalization of one of the four properties { weak Pareto eciency, equal treatment of
equals, and scale covariance are the three others { in Nash's (1950) denition of the \Nash" solution
for bargaining problems. The NTU value introduced by Shapley (1969), called \Shapley" NTU value,
generalizes, on the one hand, the TU Shapley (1953) value and, on the other hand, the Nash solution
for bargaining problems. According to Aumann, the Shapley NTU value is characterized by IIA and ve
further axioms whose TU versions characterize the TU Shapley value. Thus, the open question whether
IIA is really needed when NTU games are considered, is of particular interest. For the case of 2-person
games, we present a complete answer to the foregoing question.
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Spain. Email: josemanuel.zarzuelo@ehu.esThe paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic notation is provided and those denitions
and results due to Aumann (1985) that are relevant for our presentation are recalled, including his
characterizations of the Shapley NTU value by 6 axioms, i.e., Theorem A and Theorem B.
Section 3 formulates our main results: In the 2-person case, IIA may or may not be logically independent
of the remaining axioms employed in Theorems A and B, depending on the considered set of NTU games.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the proofs of the two main results and in Section 6 we discuss and show
the logical independence of the remaining 5 axioms.
2 Some Notation and Preliminaries
Let N be a nite nonempty set. We denote by RN the set of all real functions on N. So RN is the
jNj-dimensional Euclidean space. (Here and in the sequel, if D is a nite set, then jDj denotes the
cardinality of D.) If x;y 2 RN, then we write x > y if xi > yi for all i 2 N. Moreover, we write x > y
if x > y and x 6= y and we write x  y if xi > yi for all i 2 N. We denote RN
+ = fx 2 RN j x > 0g and
RN
++ = fx 2 RN j x  0g. A coalition (in N) is a nonempty subset of N and 2N denotes the set of all







1, if j 2 S;
0, if j 2 N n S;
the scalar product
P
i2N ixi is denoted by x, x = (ixi)i2N, S is the restriction of  to S, and 0S
denotes the zero of RS, i.e., 0S = 0S. For A;B  RN;t 2 R, we write A + B = fa + b j a 2 A;b 2 Bg;
tA = fta j a 2 Ag, A = fa j a 2 Ag, and the boundary of A, cl(A)\cl(RN nA), is denoted by @A,
where \cl" means \closure". If A is convex and closed, then we say that A is smooth if it has a unique
supporting hyperplane at each z 2 @A. We call A comprehensive if A = A   RN
+.
A TU game on N is a mapping v : 2N ! R with v(;) = 0. An NTU game on N is a mapping V that
assigns to each coalition S in N a nonempty comprehensive closed proper subset of RS such that
(1) V (N) is convex and smooth;
(2) V (N) is non-leveled, i.e., if x;y 2 V (N) and x > y, then y = 2 @V (N);
(3) for each S 2 2N n f;;Ng there exits xS 2 RN such that V (S)  f0NnSg  V (N) + fxSg:
Moreover, we use the convention that V (;) = ;. Let N and  N denote the set of all TU games and
NTU games on N, respectively. For any v 2 N the associated NTU game Vv 2  N is dened by
Vv(S) = fy 2 RS j y  S
S 6 v(S)g for all coalitions S in N. Denote  TU
N = fVv j v 2 Ng. For
T 2 2N nf;g, the unanimity game on T, uT 2 N, is dened by uT(S) = 1 for all S such that T  S  N
and uT(S) = 0 for all S  N with T nS 6= ;. The NTU unanimity game UT is the NTU game associated
with uT. The set N with coalition-wise operations is the real vector space of dimension 2jNj 1 and the set
of TU unanimity games forms a basis of N. Moreover,  N is closed under positive scalar multiplication,
but, if U;V 2  N, then U + V may not be a member of  N. However, for any  2 RN
++ and V 2  N,
2  V 2  N (for any coalition S, (  V )(S) = S  V (S)). One further notation is useful for the sequel.
For any V 2  N let d(V ) 2 RN be dened by
di(V ) = maxV fig 8i 2 N: (2.1)
Let V 2  N. By (1) and comprehensiveness of V (N), for any x 2 @V (N), there exists a unique V;x 2 RN
+
such that
N  V;x = 1 and V (N)  fy 2 RN j V;x  y 6 V;x  xg: (2.2)
Moreover, by (2), V;x  0N and, by (3), for any S 2 2N,
vV
x (S) = supf
V;x
S  y j y 2 V (S)g 2 R; (2.3)
with the convention that vV
x (;) = 0, so that vV
x 2 N. Using this notation note that
if U;V;W = U + V 2  N;x 2 U(N);y 2 V (N), and z = x + y 2 @W(N);





Now, the Shapley NTU value (the NTU value for short) of V introduced by Shapley (1969), denoted by
(V ), is dened by
(V ) = fx 2 @V (N) j V;x  x = (vV
x )g;




jSj!(jNj   jSj   1)!
jNj!
(v(S [ fig)   v(S)) 8i 2 N: (2.5)
Let     N. A solution on   is a mapping  that assigns to each V 2   a subset (V ) of V (N). The
following properties of a solution  on     N are employed.
 Axiom 1 (Non-Emptiness, NE): (V ) 6= ; for all V 2  .
 Axiom 2 (Eciency, EFF): (V )  @V (N) for all V 2  .
 Axiom 3 (Conditional Additivity, CADD): If U;V;W = U + V 2  , then (W)  ((U) + (V )) \
@W(N).






for T 2 2N n f;g.
 Axiom 5 (Scale Covariance, SCOV): If V 2  ,  2 RN
++, and   V 2  , then (  V ) =   (V ).
 Axiom 6 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, IIA): If U;V 2  , U(N)  V (N), and U(S) =
V (S) for all S $ N, then (U)  (V ) \ U(N).
In order to recall Aumann's characterization of , the following denition is useful.
Denition 2.1 Let N be a nite nonempty set and     N. Then   is a feasible domain if
(1) (V ) 6= ; for all V 2  ;
3(2)  TU
N   ;
(3) If V 2   and  2 RN
++, then   V 2  ;
(4) If V 2  , then the game that is obtained by replacing V (N) by any of its supporting half-spaces
is an element of  , i.e., if x 2 @V (N), and if W 2  N is the game that may dier from V only
inasmuch as W(N) = fy 2 RN j V;x  y 6 V;x  xg, then W 2  .
Let N be a nite nonempty set. We remark that  
N = fV 2  N j (V ) 6= ;g is a feasible domain.
Theorem 2.2 (Aumann (1985, Theorem A)) Let     N be a feasible domain. Then the Shapley
NTU value is the unique solution on   that satises Axioms 1 through 6.
Axiom 6, the IIA axiom, in the foregoing theorem may be replaced by \maximality":
Theorem 2.3 (Aumann (1985, Theorem B)) Let     N be a feasible domain. Then the Shapley
NTU value is the maximum solution on   that satises Axioms 1 through 5; i,e.,  satises Axioms 1
through 5 on  , and if the solution  on   satises Axioms 1 through 5, then (V )  (V ) for all V 2  .
3 The Main Results
The main results of our investigation are the following two theorems that provide new insight into the
role of IIA in Aumann's characterization of the Shapley NTU value for the 2-person case.
Theorem 3.1 If jNj = 2, then the Shapley NTU value on  
N is characterized by Axioms 1 through 5.
For the proof of Theorem 3.1 see Section 4. In order to state the other theorem, the following denition
is needed. Let N be a nite nonempty set and let V 2  N. Then V is called uniformly p-smooth if there
exists " > 0 such that V;x > "N for all x 2 @V (N) (for the denition of V;x see (2.2)).
Theorem 3.2 If jNj = 2 and     N is the set of uniformly p-smooth NTU games, then   is a feasible
domain and Axiom 6 (IIA) is logically independent of the remaining axioms in Theorem A.
Section 5 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.2 by means of an example of an appropriate subsolution
of the Shapley NTU value.
4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Throughout this section, let jNj = 2, say N = f1;2g. We postpone the proof and present several
preparatory remarks and lemmas.
Remark 4.1 Let V 2  N. If d(V ) 2 V (N); then j(V )j = 1. If d(V ) 2 @V (N), then (V ) = fd(V )g.
4For any function g : R ! R[f 1g let dom(g) denote the eective domain of g, i.e., dom(g) = fx 2 R j
g(x) 2 Rg. We say that g : R ! R [ f 1g is dierentiable if g0(x) exists for any x 2 dom(g). Let
 0 = fV 2  N j d(V ) = 0g and
G = fg : R ! R [ f 1g j g is concave and dierentiable, dom(g) 6= ;;g0(x) < 0 8x 2 dom(g)g:
Note that, for any g 2 G, by concavity of g, the derivative of g on dom(g) is continuous.
The mapping that assigns to each V 2  0 the function gV : R ! R [ f 1g dened by
gV (x) = supfy 2 R j (x;y) 2 V (N)g;
where sup; =  1, is a bijection from  0 to G. Hence, for each V 2  0,
f(x;gV (x)) j x 2 dom(gV )g = @V (N):
Let V 2  0 and g = gV . It is well-known that
(x;y) 2 (V ) , x 2 dom(g);y = g(x);g0(x)x =  g(x): (4.1)
It is useful to use another parametrization of @V (N). Substituting any (x;g(x)), x 2 dom(g), by





and hence  1 < f0(t) < 1 and f : R ! R is convex. We have deduced that the mapping that assigns to
each V 2  0 the convex dierentiable function fV := f is a bijection from  0 to F, where
F = ff : R ! R j f is a convex C1 function,   1 < f0(t) < 1 8t 2 Rg:
Lemma 4.2 Let V 2  0. For all t 2 R, (t   fV (t); t   fV (t)) 2 (V ) i t = fV (t)fV
0(t):
Proof: Let f = fV , g = gV , x 2 dom(g), and t =
x g(x)
2 . By (4.2),















We conclude that f(t)f0(t) = t if and only if g0(x)x =  g(x). The proof is complete by (4.1). q.e.d.
Corollary 4.3 Let U0 2  0 satisfy
fU0(0) > 0; (4.3)
fU0(t)fU0
0(t) > t 8t > 0; (4.4)
fU0(t)fU0
0(t) < t 8t < 0: (4.5)
Then, for any U 2  0 that satises
fU(0) = fU0(0); (4.6)
fU
0(t) > fU0
0(t) 8t > 0; (4.7)
fU
0(t) 6 fU0
0(t) 8t < 0; (4.8)
5the following two properties are satised:
fU
0(R) = ]   1;1[; (4.9)
(U) = f( fU(0); fU(0))g: (4.10)
Proof: In order to show (4.9), by (4.7) and (4.8), it suces to verify that supq2R fU0
0(q) = 1 and that
infq2R fU0
0(q) =  1. However, by (4.4) and (4.5), fU0(t) > t for all t > 0 and fU0(t) < t for all t < 0 so




0(q) + fU0(0) and fU0(t) > t inf
q2R
fU0
0(q) + fU0(0) 8t 2 R:
By (4.3) { (4.8), t = fU(t)fU
0(t) i t = 0. Thus, (4.10) follows from Lemma 4.2. q.e.d.
We now construct, for any  > 0, a game U0 2  0 that satises (4.4), (4.5), and fU0(0) = . Secondly,
a useful technical Lemma is proved.
For " > 0 and c 2 R, let V ";c 2  0 be dened by
V ";c(N) =






Remark 4.4 It is straightforward to verify that, for any t 2 R,
fV ";0(t) =
p
t2 + "2 (4.12)
so that, by Lemma 4.2, (V ";0) = @V ";0(N). By Denition of V ";c, for any c 2 R, fV ";c(t) = fV ";0(t)+c.
Again by Lemma 4.2, f(c;c)g = (V ";c) for all c 2 R n f0g. Furthermore, for any c > 0, U0 = V ";c
satises (4.3) { (4.5) and fU0(0) = " + c.
Lemma 4.5 Let g;h : R+ ! R+ be continuous and nondecreasing functions such that g(0) = h(0) = 0
and g(t) 6 h(t) for all t 2 R+. Then there exist continuous and nondecreasing functions e h;s : R+ ! R+
such that
e h(0) = 0;e h(t) > h(t) 8t 2 R+; (4.13)
e h(R+) = h(R+); (4.14)
e h(s(t)) = g(t) 8t 2 R+; (4.15)
s(0) = 0 6 s(t)   s(t0) 6 t   t0 8t;t0 2 R+;t0 6 t: (4.16)
Proof: In order to construct e h : R+ ! R, we introduce, for any q 2 R+, the auxiliary function
gq : R+ ! R dened by gq(t) = g(t + q) for all t > 0. Moreover, let f : R+ ! R+ [ f1g be dened by
f(q) = infft 2 R+ j gq(t) = h(t)g for all q > 0 (with the convention that inf ; = 1). Note that \inf" is
in fact \min", because g and h are continuous. Now, dene
e h(t) = sup(fh(t)g [ fgq(t) j q > 0;f(q) 6 tg) 8t 2 R+:
By construction, e h is nondecreasing and satises (4.13).
6Let t 2 R+. If there exists q with f(q) 6 t and gq(t) > h(t), then fq 2 R+ j f(q) 6 tg is a compact
interval so that \sup" is, in fact, \max" in any case. Consequently, the continuities of h and g imply the
continuity of e h and, hence, (4.14).
For  2 g(R+) denote
g() = minft 2 R+ j g(t) = g; e h() = minft 2 R+ j e h(t) = g;
g() = supft 2 R+ j g(t) = g; e h() = supft 2 R+ j e h(t) = g:
We may now dene s : R+ ! R+ as follows. For t > 0 let s(t) = minfe h() + t   g();e h()g, where
 = g(t). By construction, s is nondecreasing and satises (4.15). As e h() e h() 6 g() g() (note
that g() = 1 is just possible if maxt g(t) exists and  = maxt g(t)), s is continuous, and it satises
(4.16). q.e.d.
Now, we are prepared for the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: By Aumann's Theorem B we only have to show uniqueness. Let  be a solution
on  
N that satises NE, PO, CADD, UNA, and SCOV, let V 2  
N. Again by Theorem B, (V )  (V )
so that it suces to prove that (V )  (V ): If (V ) is a singleton, then the proof is nished by NE.
Hence, by Remark 4.1 we may assume that d = 2 V (N), where d = d(V ). Let b x 2 (V ). It remains to
show that b x 2 (V ). By SCOV we may assume that b x = d   2N.
By CADD and Remark 4.1 it suces to construct U;W 2  
N such that (U) = f 2Ng, d = d(W) 2
@W(N), and V = U + W.
In order to construct U, an auxiliary game U1 2  
N is constructed. Let U1 be the NTU game dened
by U1(N) = 1
2(V (N)   fdg)   fNg and d(U1) = 0. Then U1 2  
N and  2N 2 (U1). By Remark
4.4 there exists U0 2  0 that satises (4.3) { (4.5) and fU0(0) = 2. Let fi = fUi for i = 0;1. Recall that
f0






i(t) , if t > 0;
6 mini2f0;1g f0
i(t) , if t < 0:
By the aforementioned properties of the functions f0
i, e F(R) =]   1;1[ and e F(0) = 0.
Applying Lemma 4.5 to g;h : R+ given by g(t) = f0
1(t) and h(t) = e F(t) (or given by g(t) =  f0
1( t)
and h(t) =  e F( t), respectively), for all t > 0, guarantees the existence of continuous nondecreasing
functions F : R !]   1;1[ and s : R ! R that satisfy
F(t) > e F(t);F( t) 6 e F( t) 8t 2 R+; (4.17)
F(s(t)) = f0
1(t) 8t 2 R+; (4.18)
s(0) = 0 6 s(t)   s(t0) 6 t   t0 8t;t0 2 R;t0 6 t: (4.19)
Let f : R ! R be the unique function dened by f0 = F and f(0) = 2. Then f a convex C1 function.
Let U be the 0-normalized NTU game dened by
U(N) = fx 2 RN j 9t 2 R : x 6 (t   f(t); t   f(t))g:
7As f0(t) > f0
0(t) for all t > 0 and f0(t) 6 f0
0(t) for all t < 0, (U) = f 2Ng by Corollary 4.3 so that
U 2  0.
By (4.19), the real function b s : R ! R dened by b s(t) = 2t   s(t) for all t 2 R is a monotonic continuous
bijection that satises b s(0) = 0. Hence there exists a unique C1 function g that satises g(0) = 2 and
g0(t) = f0
1(b s 1(t)): Then g is convex, g0(0) = 0, and g0(t) 2]   1;1[ so that the NTU game W dened by
W(fig) = V (fig) for i 2 N and
W(N) = fx 2 RN j 9t 2 R : x 6 (t   g(t); t   g(t))g + f2N + dg
satises (1) and (2) of Section 2. As d = d(W) 2 @W(N); (W) = fdg by Remark 4.1.
Let h = f  s + g  b s. We claim that
h0(t) = 2f0
1(t) 8t 2 R: (4.20)







t t0 , if t 6= t0;







t t0 , if t 6= t0;
g0(t) , if t = t0;

































As f0(s(t)) = f0





Df(s(t);s(t0))   Dg(b s(t);b s(t0))

(s(t)   s(t0))
t   t0 = 0; lim
t0!t
Dg(b s(t);b s(t0))(2t   2t0)
t   t0 = 2g0(b s(t))
so that our claim follows.
Now, h(0) = 4 = 2f1(0) so that h = 2f1. By denition of f1,
U1(N) = fx 2 RN j 9t 2 R : x 6 (t   f1(t); t   f1(t))g
so that
@V (N)   fd + 2Ng
= 2@U1(N)
= f(2t   2f1(t); 2t   2f1(t)) j t 2 Rg
= f(2t   h(t); 2t   h(t)) j t 2 Rg
= f(s(t)   f(s(t)) + b s(t)   g(b s(t)); s(t)   f(s(t))   b s(t)   g(b s(t))) j t 2 Rg
so that V (N)  U(N)+W(N) is shown. In order to show that U(N)+W(N)  V (N), as U(N)+W(N) 
fdg+fx 2 RN j x(N) 6  4g, it suces to show that any element of @(U(N)+W(N)) belongs to V (N).
Let x 2 @(U(N) + W(N)). Then there exist y 2 @U(N) and z 2 @W(N) such that x = y + z.
8Let t; 2 R such that x   d   2N = (t   ; t   ). By the denition of U and W there exist
t0;t00 2 R such that y = (t0   f(t0); t0   f(t0)) and z   d   2N = (t00   g(t00); t00   g(t00)). As the
supporting hyperplane to U(N) at y is parallel to the supporting hyperplane to W(N) at z (see (2.4)),
f0(t0) = g0(t00). As s(t=2) + b s(t=2) = t, there exists  2 R such that t0 = s(t=2) +  and t00 = b s(t=2)   .
As f0(s(t=2)) = g0(b s(t=2)) and f0 and g0 are nondecreasing functions, f0(t0) = f0(s(t=2)) = g0(t00) and
 = 2f1(t=2). q.e.d.
5 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Throughout this section, let jNj = 2, say N = f1;2g, and let  ups denote the set of uniformly p-smooth
games (see Section 3 for the denition of this property) in  N. Clearly,  ups satises (2) { (4) of Denition
2.1. In order to show that  ups is a feasible domain in  N, it suces to construct, for any V 2  ups, a





(V ) , if d(V ) 2 V (N);
argmaxf(d1(V )   x1)(d2(V )   x2) j x 2 @V (N)g , if d(V ) = 2 V (N):
Note that 0 is well-dened. Indeed, if d(V ) = 2 V (N); then @V (N) \
 




compact set by uniform p-smoothness of V (N) so that supf(d1(V )   x1)(d2(V )   x2) j x 2 V (N)g is
attained by some x 2 @V (N);x  d(V ).
By Remark 4.1, 0 satises NE. Moreover, it satises SCOV and UNA. In order to show that 0(V ) 
(V ); we may assume that d(V ) = 2 V (N). Let x 2 0(V ), t = (d1(V )   x1)(d2(V )   x2), and  = V;x
(see (2.2)). Then the hyperplane fz 2 RN j   z =   xg is a tangent to the hyperbola
fz 2 RN j z  d(V );(d1(V )   z1)(d2(V )   z2) = tg
so that x 2 (V ) by (4.1) and the well-known translation covariance of .
We now show that 0 satises CADD.
Lemma 5.1 The solution 0 on  ups satises CADD.
Proof: For i 2 f1;2g, let V i 2  ups, xi 2 0(V i) such that, with V = V 1+V 2 and x = x1+x2, V 2  ups
and x 2 @V: By CADD of , x 2 (V ). It remains to show that x 2 0(V ). If d = d(V ) 2 V (N), then
the proof is nished. Hence, we may assume that d 62 V (N). As x 2 @V (N), V
i;x
i
= V;x for i = 1;2,
by (2.4). By (2.5), there exists c 2 R such that (d2   x2) = c(d1   x1), where di = d(V i) for i = 1;2. As
d = d1 + d2, Remark 4.1 implies that x1  d1 or x2  d2. Without loss of generality we may assume
that x1  d1. By denition of 0,
V 1(N)  fz 2 RN j z  d1;(d1
1   z1)(d1




2)g =: Z1 (5.1)
Let Z =

z 2 RN 
z  d;
Q




. Two cases may occur:
(1) x2 > d2. By (5.1), V (N)  fx2g + Z1. Let z 2 Z and dene z1 = z   x2. It suces to show that
z1 2 Z1. Now, z1  d1, because x2 > d2 and z  d. The statement immediately follows from:
a;b 2 RN
++;a1a2 > b1b2; > 0 =) (a1+b1)(a2+b2) > (b1+b1)(b2+b2) = (1+)2b1b2: (5.2)






. Then f is a convex function and f0(a1) = 0 i a1 = b1.
(2) x2  d2. Let
Z2 = fz 2 RN j z  d2;(d2
1   z1)(d2





By denition of 0, V 2(N)  Z2. As Z1 + Z2  Z, the proof is nished.
q.e.d.
Example 5.2 shows that 0 6= .
Example 5.2 Let X = fx 2 RN j x  0;x1x2 = 1g and U 2  N be dened by U(N) = X   RN
+ and
d(V ) = 0N. If Y = fy 2 X j xi >  3g, then Y 6= ; so that W(N) := fz 2 RN j U;y z 6 U;y y 8y 2 Y g
is uniformly p-smooth. Let d(W) = 0N. We may easily deduce that (W) = Y . Let d = N and
V 2  ups be dened by V (N) = W(N) and d(V ) = N. By symmetry of V , (V ) 3  d: Dene x by
x1 =  3 and x2 =  1
3 and observe that x 2 @V (N). However, (d1   x1)(d2   x2) = 16=3 > 4 so that
 d = 2 0(V ).
6 On the Logical Independence of the Remaining Axioms
Throughout this section, let N be a nite set such that jNj > 2. Let     N be a feasible domain. We
are now going to dene, for i = 1;:::;5; a solution i on   that exclusively violates Axiom i in Theorem
A as well as in Theorem B, even if \maximum" is replaced by \unique maximal"1.
In order to dene 1, note that, as mentioned in Section 2, any TU game v on N is a linear combination
of unanimity games, that is, there exist unique cT(v) = cT;; 6= T  N; such that v =
P
;6=TN cTuT.
As jNj > 2, there exist 2jNj   1 > 3 coalitions. Select any two distinct coalitions T1 and T2 and dene

+
N = fv 2 N j cT 1(v);cT 2(v) > 0g and 
++
N = fv 2 N j cT 1(v);cT 2(v) > 0g. For any V 2   dene
1(V ) = fx 2 @(V ) j vV
x 2 
++









satises UNA. CADD follows from (2.4). As 1 (V uN) = ;, 1 6= . Regarding the aforementioned
modication of Theorem B, it remains to show that 1 is a maximal solution that satises the remaining
axioms, i.e., Axioms 2 through 5. Assume, on the contrary, there exists a solution  that satises
EFF, CADD, UNA, SCOV, and contains 1 as a proper subsolution. Let V 2   such that there exists
x 2 (V ) n 1(V ): By EFF, x 2 @V (N). Let v = vV
x ,  = V;x, b  = (1=i)i2N, and cT = cT(v) for




( cR)uR + (1 + jcT 2j)uT 2:
Two cases may occur:
1A solution  is the unique maximal solution that satises certain axioms, if (a)  satises the axioms, (b)  is maximal
under (a) (i.e., any solution that satises the axioms and contains  coincides with ), and (c) there exists no further
maximal solution that satises the axioms.
10(1) cT 1 < 0 or cT 2 < 0, say cT 1 < 0. Then w 2 
++
N so that @(b   W)(N) = 1(b   W)  (b   W).
Now, V + b W = b (1+jcT 2j)UT 2 so that, by SCOV, (V + b W) is a singleton. On the other
hand, by CADD, @(V + b   W)(N)  (V + b   W) so that the desired contradiction has been
obtained.
(2) cT 1;cT 2 > 0, cT 1cT 2 = 0, and   x 6= (v), say cT 1 = 0. Then V + b   W = b   (1 + cT 2)UT 2




N in this case,
(b   W) = (b   W) so that CADD, applied to x and the unique element of (b   W) yields the
desired contradiction.
In order to dene the solution 2 that exclusively violates EFF and contains  as a subsolution, we
distinguish two cases: If jNj > 2, then let 2 be the solution dened by Peleg and Sudh olter (2007,





(V ) , if d(V ) = 2 V (N) or d(V ) = 0;
(V ) [ fd(V )g , otherwise:
(6.2)
Clearly, 2 satises NE and SCOV, and it violates EFF. By (2.4), 2 inherits CADD from . Moreover,
UNA and IIA are easily deduced using Remark 4.1.
The straightforward proofs that, for an arbitrary jNj > 2, the following solutions satisfy the desired
properties, are left to the reader.
3(V ) = (V ) [ fx 2 @V (N) j x  d(V )g;
4(V ) = @V (N);
5(V ) = (V ) [

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